In this paper, we analyze the dynamic labor demand structure of large Japanese firms. We propose a new dynamic model which explicitly considers the asymmetric behavior of the firms between decreasing and increasing regimes. The model modifies the ordinary partial adjustment and switching cost models. The model is a Tobit-type model; that is, the employment strategies and desired levels of labor are determined by latent variables. We estimate the model using the data augmentation algorithm, which is a Bayesian simulation method. We apply the model to the panel data constructed from financial reports of large Japanese manufacturing firms. When asymmetric adjustment costs are included in the model, we find that: i) the hiring cost does not become lower even if lay-offs and dismissals are easier, and ii) employment strategies differ among the industrial sectors even if their cost structures are similar.
Introduction
The partial adjustment model is widely used in many empirical works employing dynamic factor demand analyses because it allows easy interpretation and estimation. This model is obtained from the quadratic adjustment cost function without a fixed cost. In this model, the adjustment occurs continuously and the adjustment cost depends on the adjustment speed. (We refer to this type of adjustment cost as the variable cost.) However, Hamermesh (1989) points out that the aggregation of data makes the adjustment continuous, even if the adjustment occurs in a lumpy fashion at the micro unit level. In a study using data on U.S. manufacturing plants, Hamermesh (1989) shows the lumpy adjustment model fits better than the partial adjustment model. He suggests that the continuous adjustment can be observed by aggregating data. Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) apply both the partial adjustment and lumpy adjustment models to Japanese motor vehicle plants data using the method proposed by Hamermesh (1989) . They find that the adjustment is continuous for short-term adjustments. Although they analyze the firms' cost structures for the adjustment, they do not consider the structures of firing and hiring costs.
These two models include either the fixed or the variable adjustment costs.
The fixed cost of firing includes the costs of bargaining with the labor unions and damage to workers' morale. The cost of hiring includes the costs of recruiting and training. Therefore, when the labor inputs are measured as the number of employees, the fixed adjustment costs can not be ignored. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that the adjustment speed affects the adjustment costs. Therefore, the variable cost should also be included in the model. Hamermesh (1992) proposes a model including both the fixed and the variable adjustment costs. This model assumes that the fixed cost occurs at every period when the adjustment is implemented. However, the fixed cost mentioned above can be considered a sunk cost; that is, it rises just once, when a firm decides to adjust the labor input, and does not occur again until the adjustment is completed. Although his model also assumes that the cost structures are the same in both firing and hiring regimes, the adjustment cost structures may depend on the regimes.
In this paper, we modify the generalized model of Hamermesh (1992) and propose a new model where the fixed cost arises only when a firm begins to implement the adjustment. The model also allows different adjustment cost structures in firing and hiring regimes. Park et al. (2005) propose a method of testing asymmetry in the framework of the threshold autoregression (TAR) model. The TAR model is based on the threshold regression model, where the parameters can differ depending on whether a threshold variable is less than a threshold value (Hansen (1999) ; Caner and Hansen (2001) ). In the TAR model, the threshold variable is an observabale lagged dependent variable which is observable. In our model, following Hamermesh (1992) , the threshold variable is assumed to be unobservable. The unobservable threshold variable model is available in the framework of profit maximization. However, we cannot use the conventional estimation method for this model.
Our model is a Tobit-type model; that is, the employment strategies and desired levels of labor are determined by latent variables. The model is comprised of two parts. One is the regime switching part. A firm chooses one of three strategies; that is, firing, no adjustment, or hiring. The other determines the actual size of the adjustment. This type of model is also referred to as a friction, hidden Markov, state-space or dynamic mixture distribution model. The estimation proceeds by the data augmentation algorithm of Tanner and Wong (1987) , which is a Bayesian simulation method widely used in financial econometric analyses (e.g., Jacquier et al. (1994); Oga (2005) ). The model is estimated by the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method, which is a modification of Albert and Chib (1993) .
We construct panel data for large Japanese manufacturing firms using the annual data of these firms, and analyze the behavior of the Japanese firms using the newly developed model. We call the model an asymmetric factor adjustment model . In this model, i) a firm chooses one of three (firing, no adjustment, or hiring) regimes, ii) the regimes are determined by threshold values and iii) the speeds of adjustment are different between the firing and hiring regimes.
The threshold values reflect the sizes of the fixed cost and the adjustment speeds reflect the sizes of the variable cost. The variable cost is not the same in firing and hiring regimes in some sectors of the industry. The lower cost of the lay-offs (and dismissals) does not necessarily make hiring easier. Similar adjustment speeds do not necessarily mean similar employment behaviors. The labor adjustment behaviors may differ among firms depending on the business conditions. Unlike previous models, our model can handle these problems. This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we first give a brief review of the conventional models and introduce the asymmetric factor adjustment model. We also illustrate the estimation scheme using the MCMC method. In Section 3, we explain the construction of the panel data of the large Japanese manufacturing firms used in this paper. In Section 4, we provide estimates of the parameters for each sector of the manufacturing industry. The economic implications of the results are also evaluated in this section. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
Models and an estimation method

Conventional adjustment models
In this section we first provide a brief review of the conventional adjustment models. Then, we explain the asymmetric factor adjustment model we used in the present analysis. The ordinary partial adjustment model is expressed as
where L t is the logarithm of the labor input at period t, L * t is that of the desired level derived from the firm's static optimization problem and u t is the disturbance term. It is known that (2.1) can be derived as the solution of the dynamic optimization such that a firm maximizes the discounted total profit on an infinite time horizon by assuming a quadratic structure for the adjustment cost given by
whereL is the rate of the labor input change and b > 0 (e.g., Gould (1968); Nickell (1986) ). We can interpret λ as the speed of adjustment in (2.1). Because the interpretation is easy, the model has been widely used in empirical analyses. Hamermesh (1989) proposes the following cost structure with the fixed adjustment cost k which includes (2.2) as a special case:
When b > 0 and k = 0, (2.3) is identical to (2.2). When b = 0 and k > 0, the dynamic optimization gives the following lumpy adjustment strategy with the fixed cost, 4) where the threshold γ is an increasing function of the fixed cost k. This type of model is often called the model of friction (Maddala (1983), pp. 162-165) . In this case, the desired level L * t is immediately achieved when the firm decides to adjust the labor input. We note that (2.2) is the case where only the variable cost is considered, and (2.3) with b = 0 and k > 0 is the case where only the fixed cost is considered. Hamermesh (1989) analyzes the plant level data of one U.S. manufacturing firm with these two models. He shows that the lumpy adjustment model given by (2.4) explains the employment adjustment better than the the partial adjustment model of (2.1). Koike (1983) also suggests that two consecutive years of losses or one year of large losses causes a large amount of lay-offs in large Japanese manufacturing firms. However, he did not perform any quantitative analysis. Suruga (1998) confirms Koike's conclusion using the partial adjustment model. Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) analyze the data of a large Japanese company in the motor vehicles sector. They evaluate the short-term transfers of employees among plants of the company and among group companies using the model of Hamermesh (1989) . They show that the partial adjustment model fits better. However, they mainly analyze the fixed cost of short term transfers, and do not consider the firing and hiring costs. Therefore, their conclusion may not necessarily be true when both firing and hiring are considered. The fixed cost may be considerably large when a firm plans employment adjustments by firing or hiring.
Clearly, neither the fixed nor the variable cost should be ignored: a successful model includes both. Hamermesh (1992) proposes such a model by allowing b and k to be positive in the cost function (2.3) and shows that the following model fits well for data on airline mechanics:
where u 1t and u 2t are disturbance terms. The model in (2.5) indicates that even if the firm takes action-that is, the present value of the total profit of adjusting exceeds that of not adjusting-the adjustment is only done gradually depending on the value of adjustment coefficient λ. In the model (2.5), the fixed cost k is assumed to arise at every period. However, as mentioned in the previous section, the fixed cost consists of the costs of recruiting and training new employees, bargaining with the unions and damage to the workers' morale. Hence it may be reasonable to assume that it is a sunk cost; that is, it arises only when the firm decides to adjust the employment and does not occur again until the adjustment is completed. The firm can continue to change the employment without the fixed cost. In the model (2.5), the adjustment is also assumed to be symmetric between the firing and hiring regimes.
Theoretical basis of the asymmetric factor adjustment model
In this subsection, we explain the theoretical basis of the asymmetric factor adjustment model which is introduced in the next subsection. We assume the Cobb-Douglas production function
where A, α, β, γ are constant, Y is the production level, L S and L U are the skilled and unskilled labor inputs, and K is the capital input.
In the Japanese labor market, the primary method of labor adjustment is not lay-off (and dismissal) but adjustment of overtime working hours, as pointed out by Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) and many other researchers. However, this method requires excess payments for hoarding excess employees and overtime working hours. Therefore, we make the following assumptions.
(i) A firm can hire two types of employees, regular (permanent or full-time) and non-regular (temporary and part-time) employees. (ii) The regular employees can provide both skilled and unskilled labor. On the other hand, the non-regular employees can only provide unskilled work. (iii) Although the firm can adjust the non-regular employment without any adjustment costs, it must pay adjustment costs in the case of regular employment. (iv) The firm can increase the skilled labor input through over-time working hours without increasing the regular employment. However, the wage rate is increased by the extra payment. Table 1 summarizes these assumptions. We denote the price level of production as P , the wage rates for regular and non-regular employees as W R and W N , and the price level of capital as R at the static equilibrium.
When the firm increases its production level, it has two choices. One is paying hiring costs to increase the regular employment, and the other is keeping the number of regular employees and making them work overtime. Whether the firm increases the regular employment or not is determined by dynamic profit maximization. The firm changes the number of regular employees if and only if the present value of the profit with adjustment exceeds that without adjustment.
We define the wage rate of regular employees as
where N R is the number of regular employees, L S is the quantity of skilled labor including overtime working, and a > 0.
When the firm adjusts the regular employment, the present value of the total 
where Fc e is the fixed adjustment cost, N N is the number of non-regular employees and
is the state variable and L S (t), N N (t), K(t) and B(t) are control variables. The maximization of (2.7) constrained by B(t) =Ṅ R (t) is solved by the Maximum Principle. Solving the differential equation obtained from the first order conditions under terminal conditions gives the continuous analogue of the usual partial adjustment model.
The present value of the total profit without adjustment of the regular employment is given by
whereN R is constant. In this case, instantaneous maximization of the terms in the braces will give the solution. The firm increases the number of regular employees if and only if Pr ev > Pr ef in the expanding phase.
When the firm decreases its production level, it has two choices. One is paying firing costs to decrease the regular employment, and the other is keeping the number of regular employees and making them do unskilled jobs. When fixed costs of employment adjustment exists, the firm changes the number of regular employees if and only if the present value of the profit with adjustment exceeds that without adjustment.
Substitution of regular employees for non-regular employees is expressed as the production function: (2.10) where N 1 is the number of regular employees used as the unskilled labor input.
When the firm adjusts the regular employment, the present value of the total profit is given by
N R (t) is the state variable and N 1 (t), N N (t), K(t) and B(t) are control variables. The maximization of (2.11) constrained by B(t) =Ṅ R (t) and N N (t) ≥ 0 is solved by the maximum principle. The present value of the total profit without adjustment of the regular employment is given by
The firm adjusts the number of regular employees if and only if Pr cv > Pr cf in the contracting phase, as before.
The firm increases its employment if Pr ev − Pr ef > 0 in the expanding phase, and decreases if Pr cv − Pr cf > 0 in the contracting phase. Since these values are generally different in two phases, the thresholds and adjustment speeds should be asymmetric in expanding and contracting phases.
Asymmetric factor adjustment model
In this paper, we consider three regimes, hiring, no adjustment, and firing. We cannot directly observe the regimes of firms. We propose a model where the adjustment costs are asymmetric and the regime at period t depends on the regime at the previous period (t − 1). We change the index t to it for panel analysis where i indicates the firm, i = 1, . . . , I and t = 1, . . . , T . The model is a Tobit-type model as follows:
where y it = 1, 2, and 3 indicate the firing, no adjustment, and hiring regimes, respectively. {u kit } are independently and identically distributed and follow the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance τ −1 u . We measure L it as the logarithm of the regular employment measured by the number of regular employees. As shown in Subsection 2.2, the non-regular employment does not change our model. y it is determined by
(2.14)
it represents the logarithm of the desired regular employment for the firm i at period t estimated by the firm at t − 1. According to previous studies about factor adjustment (Hamermesh (1989 (Hamermesh ( , 1992 ; Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) ; Suruga (1998)), we model L * it in a linear function of covariates, which is derived by solving the static profit maximization problem with the Cobb-Douglas production function. We represent L * it by the following random effect model: 15) where
is the logarithm of the sales of the firm i expected at t − 1, x 2it is the logarithm of the ratio of the wage rate to the interest rate expected at t − 1, and N denotes a normal distribution. We assume that firms in period t − 1 have perfect foresight on the prices and its own sales of the next period, t.
θ is the vector of unknown parameters in Equations (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15).
Bayesian estimation of the model with latent variables
In this paper, we consider the Bayesian estimation of θ. In this section, we introduce the following prior distributions: 0] (ln(1/2), (ln(100)) 2 ) and
where G is a gamma distribution, T N [r 1 ,r 2 ] is a truncated normal distribution defined within the range [r 1 , r 2 ], and I 4 is the identity matrix of dimension 4. For the priors for λ i , τ ν and γ i , we imposed some ex ante restrictions derived from economic implications or the estimates of previous studies. γ 1 and γ 2 are the thresholds such that a firm decides to adjust the labor input, or not, according to (2.18) where N it is the number of employees and N * it is the desired level. It is unlikely that the ratio of N * it to N i,t−1 becomes either very large or very small; e.g. 10,000% or 0.01%. In fact, previous studies using TAR models search the threshold value from the realized lag y i,t−1 − y i,t−m (Caner and Hansen (2001) ; Park et al. (2005) ). So we set the means of γ 1 and γ 2 as ln(1/2) and ln(2), respectively, and both variances as (ln (100)) 2 . Since we have assumed that firms have perfect foresight, ν it , the error term of (2.15), is assumed to be small. Hamermesh (1989) and Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) reported the error terms of the logarithm of desired employment to be about 0.2. Therefore, we set the prior distribution of τ ν as the gamma distribution with mean 10 and variance 10.
As mentioned in the previous section, λ 1 and λ 2 represent the adjustment speeds and are expected to satisfy 0 ≤ λ j ≤ 1 for j = 1, 2. Since estimated adjustment coefficients were about 0.2-0.3 for the partial adjustment model (Hamermesh (1989) ; Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) ) and about 0.9 for the model with threshold, we set the prior of λ i with mean 0.5 and variance 1/16. Note that if the true λ j is close to 0, a locally unidentified problem arises, as seen in AR models (Lancaster (2004) ). In other words, the model is unidentifiable between the two cases; one case where adjustment coefficients are zero and the other case where all samples are in regime 2.
The model used here consists of two parts. One is the non-linear regression model on L it and the other is the trinomial probit model on the latent variable y it . Both parts are related to the latent variable L * it . In order to calculate the Bayes estimator of θ, we can use the data augmentation algorithm in Albert and Chib (1993) . The conditional posterior density of (L * it , y it ) can be obtained explicitly when the values of other latent variables and the parameters are given. The posterior densities of parameters for the random effect model are obtained using the method of Chib and Carlin (1999) . The global Markov property (see, e.g., Lauritzen (1996) ) is used in derivations of conditional posterior distributions. The conditional posteriors become the gamma, normal, truncated normal distributions. (Details are available from the authors upon request.)
The conditional posteriors of the latent variables are as follows.
We denote
, and
The posterior distributions of L * it for each pair of (y i,t−1 , y it ) are truncated normal distributions, as shown in Table 2 . For y it = 1, 2, 3, (yi,t−1, yit) P osterior distributions Table 3 . r 1 and r 2 .
(yi,t−1, yit) r1 r2
ν ) for some r 1 and r 2 . Table 3 presents r 1 and r 2 for each (y i,t−1 , y it ). f (y i,t+1 | y it , L it , α i , θ) can be expressed as in Table 4 .
for other pairs of (y i,t−1 , y it ) can be obtained as in Table 5 .
The Gibbs sampling is used as a sampling scheme. Let L and 
(iii) Based on the values of (L * (l) , y (l) , α (l−1) , θ (l−1) ) calculated by the previous step, sample the l-th stage parameters θ (l) .
After a substantial number of samplings, samples of θ generated by this algorithm can be regarded as samples obtained by the marginal distributions. The mean of those samples is a Bayes estimator of θ. We calculate the sample mean and the standard deviation from 100,000 draws after discarding the first 10,000 trials as the burn-in period.
In practice, we fix all values of y i0 at 2 for simplicity. It has been pointed out that setting arbitrary initial conditions may cause a problem (Heckman (1981) ). However, this was not a critical problem in this study, since the number of periods was large, and the obtained portions of regime 1 were significantly different from zero.
Data
In this paper, we use panel data constructed from the annual financial data of large Japanese manufacturing firms during fiscal years 1980-2004 from the Nikkei NEEDS-Financial QUEST. This database is based on individual financial reports and Nikkei's original research. Japan experienced a bubble economy in the latter half of the 1980s and a subsequent recession in the 1990s. The labor demand increased during the bubble period and it declined from the mid 90s and still remains low. Hence the observation period is expected to include both increasing and decreasing regimes of labor input. The data is collected from sixteen small sectors defined by their main products, as shown in Table 6 .
The summary of the data is given in Table 7 . This table shows the sample means and the standard deviations of the number of employees (N it ), its fluctuation rate (N it /N i,t−1 ), the sales (Y it ), the wage rate (W it ), the interest rate (R it ) and the number of firms (I) in each sector. For N it , we use the number of regular employees at the end of the fiscal year. The number of periods, T , is 24. Each monetary value is deflated using the deflator classified by economic activities reported by the Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), Cabinet Office of the Japanese government.
One disadvantage of this database is that the data is annual, and temporal aggregations may cause a bias that underestimates the size of the fixed cost, as pointed out by Hamermesh (1989) . The advantages are i) since the data is constructed for multiple sectors and multiple firms are included in each sector, we can capture the characteristics of the cost structures for various sectors, and ii) we can also use factor prices, which are not available in Hamermesh (1989) and Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) . 
Results
In this section, we provide the results of the estimation of the asymmetric factor adjustment model using the panel data of large Japanese manufacturing firms. We also discuss some of the implications of the estimates of parameters for each small sector of the manufacturing industry. Tables 8-10 present the estimates of the parameters and the standard deviations. We also provide Geweke's (1992) Convergence Diagnostic (CD) for each parameter. With respect to the samples after the burn-in period, we examined whether there was a significant difference between the mean of the first 10% of samples and that of the last 50%. We calculated the CD using the BOA (Bayesian Output Analysis) package of the R language. On this calculation, we used the last ten thousand samples for Sectors 4 and 12 and the last twelve thousand samples for the other sectors because of the hardware restriction.
Since the estimates of λ 2 in many sectors are very close to zero, we also estimated a model which excludes regime 3. Hereafter, we refer to this model as the one-sided model . Since the results are rather large, Tables 8-10 contain estimates of either the asymmetric adjustment model or the one-sided model. The selection of the model is based on the marginal likelihood values calculated according to Chib (1995) . The full results of estimation are available upon request to the authors. p 1 , p 2 and p 3 in Table 8 represent the portions where y it takes a value of 1, 2 and 3, respectively. We are interested in the adjustment speed parameters, λ 1 and λ 2 , and the threshold parameters, γ 1 and γ 2 . The petroleum products sector (Sector 6) is not estimable, since the sample paths of the parameters become unstable (switching occurs between the two modes of the posterior densities). We consider that this happens because the sample size is small, and we removed Sector 6 from the results. For the same reason, we removed the non-ferrous sector (Sector 10), which included only one firm. The textile sector (Sector 2) is removed because Geweke's CDs for the adjustment coefficients indicated the samples do not converge.
The parameters of linear regression equation (2.15) can be interpreted as follows. The desired labor input L * it will increase if the demand for products Y it increases and will decrease if the price of labor relative to that of capital increases, since the capital is substituted for the labor. From this viewpoint, β 1 is expected to be positive and β 2 is expected to be negative. β 3 is expected to be negative because the technical progress will decrease the input required for a certain level of output. From Tables 9 and 10 , these conditions are satisfied in eight manufacturing sectors, which are the food products (Sector 1), chemicals (Sector 4), medical products (Sector 5), rubber products (Sector 7), non-metallic mineral products (Sector 8), fabricated metal products (Sector 11), precision instruments (Sector 15) and other manufacturing (Sector 16) sectors. The asymmetric behaviors between increasing and decreasing regimes are clear; that is, the values of p 1 and p 3 are different and the values of λ 1 and λ 2 , which represent adjustment speeds, are also different in all sectors. Park et al. (2005) proposed a method of testing asymmetry that calculates the posterior probabilities of the all patterns of the parameter values. We simply use the mean and standard deviation of each parameters in the following discussion. The asymmetric behaviors are also confirmed by the model selection with the marginal likelihood values. The one-sided model is selected in 7 sectors. In the food products sector (Sector 1), 10% of the behaviors are classified as belonging to regime 1 and the estimated value of λ 1 is 0.61, which is far larger than the results from the conventional model (Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) ). However, λ 2 is close to zero. Similar results are observed in Sectors 7, 11 and 16, where the estimated values of λ 1 are 0.61-1.02. The one-sided model is selected in Sectors 3, 4, 9 (iron and steel), 12 (machinery), 13 (electrical machinery), 14 (transport equipment) and 15. The estimates of λ 1 take large values of 0.57-0.77 in these sectors. We can consider that the sectors for which the one-sided model is selected, have essentially the same structure of adjustment costs as the Sectors 1, 7, 11 and 16. Since the firms in these sectors increase the numbers of employees mainly through standard hiring (just hiring new graduates in April), the adjustment speeds become very slow in the hiring regime. However, these firms reduce the numbers of employees rapidly when necessary. As Hamermesh (1993) points out, the hiring speed is determined by not only the cost structure, but also conditions of labor supply (unemployment rate). In this paper, we can treat supply shocks as recruiting costs because we do not examine temporal differences, and the labor market is considered identical for every sector (the craft union is not common in Japan). The variable cost is supposed to be small in the decreasing regime and large in the increasing regime in these sectors. This is explained by the fact that i) the firms know the ability of their employees but do not know the ability of workers in the labor market, and ii) the firms increase overtime and part-time work before increasing permanent employees. The results also suggest that even if the employment reduction is easy, the opposite action may not be easy. This is particularly important for labor legislators.
In the medical (Sector 5) and non-metallic mineral products sector (Sector 8), all λ 1 and λ 2 are less than 0.3 and γ 1 and γ 2 are close to zero. These facts indicate that there is a small fixed cost and a large variable cost. The adjustments are done slowly in both regimes in these sectors. Since λ 1 takes similar values in these two sectors, the cost structures of these sectors appear to be similar. While the large value of p 1 (p 1 = 0.72) and small value of p 3 (p 3 = 0.28) for Sector 8 imply that the firms in this sector tended to reduce the employment during the observation period, the values for Sector 5 indicate the opposite direction of the trend (p 1 = 0.36 and p 3 = 0.64). Differences in the values of p 1 , p 2 and p 3 among sectors can be explained by the business conditions of individual sectors provided that the other factors are kept equal. If the sector is in a recession, a frequent labor reduction will end up resulting in a large value of p 1 . We also expected that the higher fixed cost would increase the values of |γ 1 |, but they were rather small in many sectors.
The results strongly suggest that the fixed cost in the reduction regime may not be large. Although Hamermesh (1989) points out that an estimated fixed cost may become small by the aggregation of data, (For details, see Caballero et al. (1997) .) it is extremely unlikely that such an effect would have changed our results. The temporal aggregation of data causes a problem only when the firm frequently changes its employment strategy. However, the firm cannot change its employment strategy in a short period of time if the fixed cost is high.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we proposed a new asymmetric adjustment model with thresholds, and estimated the model using panel data from large Japanese manufacturing companies. The findings are as follows.
(i) In almost all sectors, the variable cost is small in the decreasing regime but large in the increasing regime. Even if lay-offs are easy, the hiring action is not necessarily easy. (ii) Even if the sectors have similar cost structures, their directions of employment action differ according to their business conditions. (iii) The estimated fixed cost is not as large as we expected.
Although there is a limitation inherent in the data used in this study, it is reasonable to conclude that the employment strategy of individual firms is asymmetric between decreasing and increasing regimes. By explicitly treating asymmetric structures in the model, we obtain more accurate effects of the variable and fixed costs than the previous studies, where the conventional symmetric models were used. Ignoring the asymmetric structure might result in inconsistent results.
